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THE INTELLIGENCE OF ANIMALvS.'
HY PROF. TH. RIIiOT.
IN the immense realm of the invertebrates, the highest psychical
development is, by general acknowledgment, met with among
the social Hymenoptera ; and the capital representatives of this
group are the ants. To these we may confine ourselves. Despite
their tiny size, their brain, particularly among the neuters, is re-
markable in structure—"one of the most marvellous atoms," says
Darwin, "in all matter, not excepting even the human brain." In-
juries to this organ, which are frequent in their sanguinary com-
bats, cause disorders quite analogous to those observed in mam-
mals. It is useless to recall what every one knows of their habits
their organisation of labor, varied methods of architecture, their
wars, plundering and rape, practice of slavery, methods of educa-
tion, and (in certain species) their agricultural labors, harvesting,
construction of granaries, etc.^ We, on the contrary, must examine
the exceptional cases in which the ants depart from their general
habits ; for their ability to abstract, to generalise, and to reason,
can only be established by new adaptations to unaccustomed cir-
cumstances. The following may serve as examples :
"A nest was made near one of our tramways," says Mr. Belt,
" and to get to the trees, the leaves of which they were harvesting,
the ants had to cross the rails, over which the cars were continually
passing and re-passing. Every time they came along a number of
ants were crushed to death. They persevered in crossing for some
time, but at last set to work and tunnelled underneath each rail.
One day, when the cars were not running, I stopped up the tunnels
with stones ; but although great numbers carrying leaves were thus
cut off from the nest, they would not cross the rails, but set to
work making fresh tunnels underneath them."
ITransIated from the French by Frances A. Welby.
2 For details see Romanes, Animal Intelligence, Chapters III. and V.
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Another observer, Dr. Ellendorf, who has carefully studied the
ants of Central America, recounts a similar experience. These in-
sects cut off the leaves of trees and carry them to their nests, where
they serve various purposes. One of their columns was returning
laden with spoils.
"I placed a dry branch, nearly a foot in diameter, obliquely
across their path, which was lined on either side by an impassable
barrier of high grass, and pressed it down so tightly on the ground
that they could not creep underneath. The first comers crawled
beneath the branch as far as they could, and then tried to climb
over, but failed owing to the weight on their heads. . . . They then
stood still as if awaiting a word of command, and I saw with aston-
ishment that the loads had been laid aside by more than a foot's
length of the column, one imitating the other. And now work be-
gan on both sides of the branch, and in about half an hour a tunnel
was made beneath it. Each ant then took up its burden again,
and the march was resumed in the most perfect order."
They also show considerable inventiveness in the construction
of bridges. It appears from numerous observations that they know
how to place straws on the surface of water, and to keep them in
equilibrium or unite their several ends together with earth, moisten
them with their saliva, restore them when destroyed, and to con-
struct a highway made of grains of sand, etc. (Reaumur.) They
even employ living bridges : " The ground about a maple tree hav-
ing been smeared with tar so as to check their ravages, the first
ants who attempted to cross stuck fast. But the others were not
to be thus entrapped. Turning back to the tree they carried down
aphides which they deposited on the tar one after another until
they had made a bridge over which they could cross the tarred spot
without danger."^
I shall cite no observations on the intelligence of wasps and
bees, but I wish to note one rudimentary case of generalisation,
Huber remarked that bees bite holes through the base of corollas
when these are so long as to prevent them from reaching the honey
in the ordinary way. They only resort to this expedient when they
find they cannot reach the nectar from above ; "but having once
ascertained this, they forthwith proceed to pierce the bottoms of
all the flowers of the same species." Doubtless association and
habit may be invoked here, but before these were produced, was
there not an extension of like to like?
For the higher animals I shall also restrict myself to the upper
1 Romanes, Animal Intelligence, Chapter III.
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types. We shall of course reject all observations relating to " per-
forming " animals, all acquirements due to education and training
by man, as also the cases in which, as in the beaver, there is a per-
plexing admixture of instinct so called (a specific property), and
adaptation, varying according to time and place.
The elephant has a reputation for intelligence which may be
somewhat exaggerated. His psychology is fairly well known. We
may cite a few characteristic traits that bear upon our subject. He
will tear up bamboo canes from the ground, break them with his
feet, examine them, and repeat the operation until he has found
one that suits him ; he then seizes the branch with his trunk and
uses it as a scraper to remove the leeches which adhere to his skin
at some inaccessible part of his body. "This is a frequent occur-
rence, such scrapers being used by each elephant dail}-." When
he is tormented by large flies he selects a branch which he strips
of its leaves, except at the top, where he leaves a fine bunch. "He
will deliberately clean it down several times, and then laying hold
of its lower end he will break it off, thus obtaining a fan or switch
about five feet long, handle included. With this he keeps the flies
at bay. Say what we may, these are both really bona fide imple-
ments, each intelligently made for a definite purpose."
"What I particularly wish to observe," says an experienced
naturalist, "is that there are good reasons for supposing that ele-
phants possess abstract ideas ; for instance, I think it is impossible
to doubt that they acquire through their own experience notions of
hardness and weight, and the grounds on which I am led to think
this are as follows. ' A captured elephant, after he has been taught
his ordinary duty, say about three months after he is taken, is
taught to pick up things from the ground and give them to his
mahout sitting on his shoulders. Now for the first few months it
is dangerous to require him to pick up anything but soft articles,
such as clothes, because the things are often handed up with con-
siderable force. After a time, longer with some elephants than
others, they appear to take in a knowledge of the nature of the
things they are required to lift, and the bundle of clothes will be
thrown up sharply as before, but heavy things, such as a crowbar
or piece of iron chain, will be handed up in a gentle manner ; a
sharp knife will be picked up by its handle and placed on the ele-
phant's head, so that the mahout can also take it by the handle. I
have purposely given elephants things to lift which they could never
have seen before, and they were all handled in such a manner as to
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convince me that they recognised such qualities as hardness, sharp-
ness, and weight."
Lloyd Morgan, who, in his books on comparative psychology,
is evidently disposed to concede as small a measure of intelligence
to animals as possible, comments upon the above observation as
follows : ^
"Are we to suppose that these animals possess abstract ideas?
I reply—That depends upon what is meant by abstract ideas. If
it is implied that the abstract ideas are isolates ; that is, qualities
considered quite apart from the objects of which they are charac-
teristic, I think not. But if it be meant that elephants, in a prac-
tical way, 'recognise such qualities as hardness, sharpness, and
weight,' as predominant elements in the constructs they form, I am
quite ready to assent to the proposition."
I agree fully with this conclusion, adding the one remark that
between the pure abstract notion and the "predominant" notion
so called, there is only a difference of degree. If the predominant
element is not isolated, detached, and fixed by a sign, it is certainly
near being so, and deserves on this ground to be called an abstract
of the lower order.
The observation of Houzeau has been frequently quoted re-
specting dogs, which, suffering from thirst in arid countries, rush
forty or fifty times into the hollows that occur along their line of
march in the hope of finding water in the dry bed. They could
not be attracted by the smell of the water, nor by the sight of vege-
tation, for these are wanting. They must thus be guided by gen-
eral ideas, which are doubtless of an extremely simple character,
and, in some measure, supported by experience."
It is on this account that the term "generic image" would in
my opinion be preferable for describing cases of this character.
"I have frequently seen not only dogs, but horses, mules, cat-
tle, and goats, go in search of water in places which they had never
visited before. They are guided by general principles, because
they go to these watering places at times when the latter are per-
fectly dry. 2 Undoubtedly it may be objected that association of
images here plays a preponderating part. The sight of the hollows
recalls the water which, though absent, forms part of a group of
sensations which has been perceived many times ; but since the
generic image is, as we shall see later, no more than an almost
IC. Lloyd Morgan. Animal Life and Intelligence, Chapter IX., p. 364.
8 Houzeau, Etudes sur les facultis meniales des anitnaux. Vol. II., p. 264 et seq. The same
author gives an example of generalisation in bees.
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passive condensation of resemblances, these facts clearly indicate
its nature and its limits.
I shall merely allude without detailed comment to the numer-
ous observations on the aptitude of dogs and cats for finding means
to accomplish their aims, the anecdotes of their mechanical skill,
and the ruses (so well described by G. Leroy) which the fox and
the hare employ to outwit the hunter, "when they are old and
schooled by experience ; since it is to their knowledge of facts that
they owe their exact and prompt inductions." The most intelligent
of all animals, the higher orders of monkeys, have not been much
studied in their wild state, but such observations as have been
made, some of which have been contributed by celebrated natural-
ists, fix with sufficient distinctness the intellectual level of the bet-
ter endowed. The history of Cuvier's orang-outang has been quoted
to satiety. The more recent books on comparative psychology con-
tain ample testimony to their ability to profit by experience^ and
to construct instruments. A monkey, not having the strength to
lift up the lid of a chest, employed a stick as a lever. "This use
of a lever as a mechanical instrument is an action to which no ani-
mal other than a monkey has ever been known to attain." Another
monkey observed by Romanes, also "succeeded by methodical in-
vestigation, without assistance, in discovering for himself the me-
chanical principle of the screw ; and the fact that monkeys well
understand how to use stones as hammers, is a matter of common
observation." They are also skilful in combining their stratagems,
as in the case of one who, being held captive by a chain, and thus
unable to reach a -brood of ducklings, held out a piece of bread in
one hand, and on tempting a duckling within his reach, seized it
by the other, and killed it with a bite in the breast. "-
One mental operation remains which must be examined sepa-
rately, and in its study we shall pursue the same method, wherever
it occurs, throughout this work. The process in question has the
advantage of being perfectly definite, of restricted scope, com-
pletely evolved, and accessible to research in all the phases of its
development, from the lowest to the highest. It is that of nutnera-
tion.
Are there animals capable of counting? G. Lero\- is, I believe,
the first who answered this question in the affirmative, in a passage
which is worth transcribing, although it has been often quoted.
1 Darwin, The Descent ofMan, Vol. I., Chapter III.
S Romanes, loc. cit.. Chapter XVII.
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"Among the various ideas which necessity adds to the experience
of animals, that of number must not be overlooked. Animals count,
—so much is certain ; and although up to the present time their
arithmetic appears weak, it may perhaps be possible to strengthen
it. In countries where game is preserved, war-is made upon mag-
pies because they steal the eggs of other birds. . . . And in order to
destroy this greedy family at a blow, game-keepers seek to destroy
the mother while sitting. To do this it is necessary to build a well-
screened watch-house at the foot of the tree where the nests are,
and in this a man is stationed to await the return of the parent bird,
but he will wait in vain if the bird has been shot at under the same
circumstances before. . . . To deceive this suspicious bird, the plan
was hit upon of sending two men into the watch-house; one of them
passed on while the other remained ; but the magpie counted and
kept her distance. The next day three went, and again she per-
ceived that only two withdrew. It was eventually found necessary
to send five or six men to the watch-house in order to put her out
of her calculation. . . . This phenomenon, which is repeated as
many times as the attempt is made, is one of the most extraordi-
nary instances of the sagacity of animals." Since then the question
has been repeatedly taken up. Lubbock devotes to it the three
last pages of his book The Senses of Animals. According to his ob-
servations on the nests of birds, one egg may be taken from a nest
in which there are four, but if we take away two the bird generally
deserts its nest. The solitary wasp provisions its cell with a fixed
number of victims. Sand wasps are content with one. One spe-
cies of Eumenes prepares five victims for its young, another species
ten, another fifteen, another twenty-four; but the number of the
victims is always the same for the same species. How does the
insect know its characteristic number?^
An experiment, methodically conducted by Romanes, proved
that a chimpanzee can count correctly as far as five, distinguishing
the words which stand for one, two, three, four, five, and at com-
mand deliver the number of straws requested of her.^
Although the observations on this point are not yet sufficiently
varied and extended to enable us to speak of them as we should
wish, it must be remarked that the cases cited are not alike, and
lAt the end of the passage in question there is an extraordinary account of the arithmetical
powers of a dog, which Lubbock explains by " thought reading." I omit this instance, since we
are deliberately rejecting all rare or doubtful cases.
^Mental Evolution in Man, Chapter III., p. 58.
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that it would be illegitimate to reduce them all to one and the same
psychological mechanism.
1. The case of insects is the most embarrassing. It is but
candid to state a non liquet, since to attribute their achievements to
unconscious numeration, or to some special equivalent instinct, is
tantamount to saying nothing. Besides, we are not concerned with
anything relating to instinct.
2. The case of the monkey and his congeners stands high in
the scale : it is a form of concrete numeration which we shall
meet again in children, and in the lowest representatives of hu-
manity.
3. All the other cases resemble the alleged "arithmetic" of
G. Leroy's magpie and similar observations. I see here not a nu-
meration, but a perception of plurality, which is something quite
different. There are in the brain of the animal a number of co-ex-
isting perceptions. It knows if all are present, or if some are lack-
ing ; but a consciousness of difference between the entire group,
and the diminished defective group, is not identical with the oper-
ation of counting. It is a preliminary state, an introduction, noth-
ing more, and the animal does not pass beyond this stage, does
not count in the exact sense of the word. We shall see in a subse-
quent article that observations with young children furnish proofs
in favor of this assertion, or at least show that it is not an un-
founded presumption, but the most probable hypothesis.
We may now without further delay (while reserving the facts
which are to be studied in the sequel to this article) attempt to
fix the nature of the forms of abstraction, and of reasoning, acces-
sible to the higher animal types.
I. The generic image results from a spontaneous fusion of im-
ages, produced by the repetition of similar, or ver}- analogous,
events. It consists in an almost passive process of assimilation ; it
is not intentional, and has for its subject only the crudest similari-
ties. There is an accumulation, a summation of these resem-
blances ; they predominate by force of numbers, for they are in the
majority. Thus there is formed a solid nucleus which predomi-
nates in consciousness, an abstract appurtenant to all similar ob-
jects ; the differences fall into oblivion. Huxley's comparison of
the composite photographs (cited in the last article) renders it
needless to dwell on this point. Their genesis depends on the one
hand on experience
;
(only events that are frequently repeated can
be condensed into a generic image ;) on the other hand on the ef-
fective dispositions of the subject (pleasure, pain, etc.), on inter-
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est, and on practical utility, which render certain perceptions
predominant. They require, accordingly, no great intellectual
development for their formation, and there can be no doubt that
they exist quite low down in the animal scale. The infant of four
or five months very probably possesses a generic image of the
human form and of some similar objects. It may be remarked,
further, that this lower form of abstraction can occur also in the
adult and cultivated man. If, e. g., we are suddenly transported
into a country whose flora is totally unknown to us, the repetition
of experiences suggests an unconscious condensation of similar
plants ; we classify them without knowing their names, without
needing to do so, and without clearly apprehending their distin-
guishing characteristics, those namely which constitute the true
abstract idea of the botanist.
In sum, the generic image comes half way between individual
representation, and abstraction properly so called. It results
almost exclusively from the faculty of apprehending resemblances.
The role of dissociation is here extremely feeble. Everything takes
place, as it were, in an automatic, mechanical fashion, in conse-
quence of the unequal struggle setup in consciousness between the
resemblances which are strengthened, and the differences, each of
which remains isolated.
2. It has been said that the principal utility of abstraction is
as an instrument in ratiocination. We may say the same of generic
images. By their aid animals reason. This subject has given rise
to extended discussion. Some writers resent the mere suggestion
that ants, elephants, dogs, and monkeys, should be able to reason.
Yet this resentment is based on nothing but the extremely broad
and elastic signification of the word reasoning—an operation which
admits of many degrees, from simple, empirical consecutiveness to
the composite, quantitative reasoning of higher mathematics. It is
forgotten that there are here, as for abstraction and for generalisa-
tion, embryonic forms—those, i. e., which we are now studying.
Taken in its broadest acceptation, reasoning is an operation of
the mind which consists in passing from the known to the un-
known ; in passing from what is immediately given, to that which
is simply suggested by association and experience. The logician
will unquestionably find this formula too vague, but it must neces-
sarily be so, in order to cover all cases.
Without pretending to any rigorous enumeration, beyond all
criticism, we can, in intellectual development, distinguish the fol-
lowing phases in the ascending order : perceptions and images
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(memories) as point of departure; association by contiguity, asso-
ciation by similarit}'; then the advance from known to unknown,
by reasoning from particular to particular, by analogical reasoning,
and finally by the perfect forms of induction and deduction, with
their logical periods. Have all these forms of reasoning a common
substrate, a unity of composition ? In other words, can they be re-
duced to a single type—of induction according to some, of deduc-
tion according to others ? Although the supposition is extremely
probable, it would not be profitable to discuss the question here.
We must confine ourselves to the elementary forms which the logi-
cians admit, or despise, for the most part, but which, to the psy-
chologists, are intellectual processes as interesting as any others.
Without examining whether, as maintained by J. S. Mill, all
inference is actually from particular to particular (general proposi-
tions being under this hypothesis only simple retninders, brief for-
mulae serving as a base of operations) it is clear that we have in it
the simplest form of mental progress from the known to the un-
known. At the same time it is more than mere association, though
transcending it only in degree. Association by similarity is not,
as we have seen, identical with formation of generic images ; this
last implies fusion, mental synthesis. So, too, reasoning from par-
ticular to particular implies something more than simple associa-
tion ; it is a state of expectation equivalent to a conclusion in the
empirical order ; it is an anticipation. The animal which has
burned itself in swallowing some steaming food, is on its guard in
future against everything that gives off steam. Here we have more
than simple associ3.tion between two anterior experiences (steam,
burning; and this state "differs from simple associative sugges-
tion, by the fact that the mind is less occupied with the memory of
past burns than with the expectation of a repetition of the same
fact in the present instance ; that is to say, that it does not so
much recall the fact of having once been burnt as it draws the con-
clusion that it will be burnt. "^
Otherwise expressed, he is orientated less towards the past
than towards the future. Granted that this tendency to believe
that what has occurred once or twice will occur invariably, is a
fruitful source of error, it remains none the less a logical operation
(judgment or ratiocination) containing an element more than asso-
ciation : an inclusion of the future, an implicit affirmation ex-
IJ. Sully, The Human Mind, I., 460. The author gives excellent diagrams to represent the
difiference in the two cases. For reasoning from particular to particular, cf. also J. S. Mill, Logic,
II., Chapter III., p. 3 ; Bradley, Logic, II., Chapter II., p. 2.
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pressed in an act. Doubtless, between these two processes,—asso-
ciation, inference from particular to particular—the difference is
slight enough
;
yet in a study of genesis and evolution, it is just
these transitional forms that are the most important.
Reasoning by analogy is of a far higher order. It is the prin-
cipal logical instrument of the child and of primitive men : the
substrate of all extension of language, of vulgar and empirical
classifications, of myths, of the earliest, quasi-scientific knowledge. ^
It is the commencement of induction, differing from the latter, not
in form, but in its imperfectly established content. "Two things
are alike in one or several characteristics ; a proposition stated is
true of the one, therefore it is true of the other. A is analogous to
B \ m is true of A, therefore m is true of B also." So runs the for-
mula of J. S. Mill. The animal, or child, which when ill-treated
by one person extends its hatred to all others that resemble the op-
pressor, reasons by analogy. Obviously this procedure from known
to unknown will vary in degree,—from zero to the point at which
it merges into complete induction.
With these general remarks, we may return to the logic of ani-
mals or rather to the sole kind of logic possible without speech.
This is, and can only be, a logic of images (Romanes employs a
synonymous expression, logic of recepts), which is to logic, properly
so called, what generic images are to abstraction and to generalisa-
tion proper. This denomination is necessary ; it enables us to
form a separate category, well defined by the absence of language
;
it permits us, in speaking of judgment and ratiocination in animals,
and in persons deprived of speech, to know exactly what meaning
is intended.
It follows that there are two principal degrees in the logic of
images.
1. Inference from particular to particular. The bird which
finds bread upon the window, one morning, comes back next day
at the same hour, finds it again, and continues to come. It is
moved by an association of images, plus the state of awaiting, of
anticipation, as described above.
2. Procedure by analogy. This (at least in its higher forms
in animal intelligence) presupposes mental construction : the aim
is definite, and means to attain it are invented. To this type I
should refer the cases cited above of ants digging tunnels, forming
bridges, etc. The ants are wont to practise these operations in
l/» re analogy, consult Stern's monograph, Die Analogie itn volksihiinilichen Denken, Berlin,
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their normal life ; their virtue lies in the power of dissociation from
their habitual conditions, from their familiar ant-heap, and of adap-
tation to new and unknown cases.
The logic of images has characteristics which pertain to it ex-
clusively, and which may be summarised as follows :
1. As material it employs concrete representations or generic
images alone, and cannot escape from this domain. It admits of
fairly complex constructions, but not of substitution. The tyro
finds no great difficulty in solving problems of elementary arithmetic
(such as : 15 workmen build a wall 3 metres high in 4 days ; how
long will it take 4 men to build it?), because he uses the logic of
signs, replacing the concrete facts by figures, and working out the
relations of these. The logic of images is absolutely refractory to
attempts at substitution. And while it thus acts by representation
only, its progress even within this limit is necessarily very slow,
encumbered, and embarrassed by useless details, for lack of ade-
quate dissociation. At the same time it may, in the adult who is
practised in ratiocination, become an auxiliary in certain cases
; I
am even tempted to regard it as the main auxiliary of constructive
imagination. It would be worth while to ascertain, from authentic
observations, what part it plays in the inventions of novelists, poets,
and artists. In a polemic against Max Miiller, who persists in af-
firming that it is radically impossible to think and reason without
words, a correspondent remarks :
"Having been all my life since school-days engaged in the
practice of architecture and civil engineering, I can assure Prof.
Max Miiller that designing and invention are done entirely by men-
tal pictures. I find that words are only an encumbrance. In fact,
words are in many cases so cumbersome that other methods hax^e
been devised for imparting knowledge. In mechanics the graphic
method, for instance."^
2. Its aim is always practical. It should never be forgotten
that at the outset, the faculty of cognition is essentially utilitarian,
and cannot be otherwise, because it is employed solely for the pres-
ervation of the individual (in finding food, distinguishing enemies
from prey, and so on). Animals exhibit only applied reasoning,
tested by experience ; they feel about and choose between several
means,— their selection being justified or disproved by the final
i Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought , delivered at the Royal Institution
appendix, p. 6, letter 4 ; Chicago, 1SS8. It should, however, be remembered that the writer who
thus uses the logic of images has a mind preformed by the logic of signs : which is not the case
with animals.
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issue. Correctly speaking, the logic of images is neither true nor
false ; these epithets are but half appropriate. It succeeds or fails ;
its gauge is success or defeat ; and as we maintained above that it
is the secret spring of aesthetic invention, let it be noticed that here
again there is no question of truth or error, but of creating a suc-
cessful or abortive work.
Accordingly, it is only by an unjustifiable restriction that the
higher animals can be denied all functions beyond that of associa-
tion, all capacity for inference by similarity. W. James (after
stating that, as a rule, the best examples of animal sagacity "may
be perfectly accounted for by mere contiguous association, based
on experience "), arrives virtually at a conclusion no other than
our own. After recalling the well-known instance of arctic dogs
harnessed to a sledge and scattering when the ice cracked to dis-
tribute their weight, he thus explains it : "We need only suppose
that they have individually experienced wet skins after cracking,
that they have often noticed cracking to begin when they were hud-
dled together and that they have observed it to cease when they
scattered."
Granting this assumption, it is none the less true that associa-
tions by contiguity are no more than the ?naterial which serves as a
substratum for inference by similarity, and for the act which fol-
lows. Again, a friend of James, accompanied by his dog, went to
his boat and found it filled with dirt and water. He remembered
that the sponge was up at the house, and not caring to tramp a
third of a mile to get it, he enacted before his terrier (as a for-
lorn hope) the necessary pantomime of cleaning the boat, saying :
"Sponge, sponge, go fetch the sponge." The dog trotted off and
returned with it in his mouth, to the great surprise of his master.
Is this, properly speaking, an act of reasoning? It would only be
so, says James, if the terrier, not finding the sponge, had brought
a rag, or a cloth. By such substitution he would have shown that,
notwithstanding their different appearance, he understood that for
the purpose in view, all these objects were identical. "This sub-
stitution, though impossible for the dog, any man but the stupidest
could not fail to do." I am not sure of this, despite the categorical
assertion of the author
;
yet, discussion apart, it must be admitted
that this would be asking the dog to exhibit a man's reason. As a
matter of fact, notwithstanding contrary appearances, James ar-
rives at a conclusion not very different from our own. "The char-
acters extracted by animals are very few, and always related to
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their immediate interests and emotions." This is what we termed
above, empirical reasoning.
G. Leroy said : "Animals reason, but differently from our-
selves." This is a negative position. We advance a step farther
in saying : their reasoning consists in a heritage of concrete or gen-
eric images, adapted to a determined end,—intermediary between
the percepts and the act. It is impossible to reduce everything to
association by similarity, much less by contiguity, alone ; since
such procedure results necessarily in the formation of unchange-
able habits, in limitation to a narrow routine, whereas we have
seen that certain animals are capable of breaking through such re-
strictions.
